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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to derive a method to control for idiosyn-
cratic and unobserved pricing which can easily be used in applied produc-
tivity research. Irrespective the empirical focus, the analysis is theoreti-
cally driven by integrating a generalized model of incomplete competition
that states consumer preferences for more product variety into the familiar
Cobb–Douglas production function framework. To conclude, ignoring the
existence of incomplete markets and associated heterogeneous price set-
ting behavior leads to biased estimates of factor elasticities. Fortunately,
the corresponding price bias can be expressed by two (observable) vari-
ables: a) total production at the industry level and b) the ﬁrm’s market
share in the segment of the major product. Consequently, augmenting the
productivity equation by those variables would remove the bias. In the
empirical part of the paper the price bias elimination method is applied to
the manufacturing sector. In general and for consumer goods industries,
empirical results suggest application of the method. Price-cost margins
obviously differ within and also between industries. Moreover, the widely
adopted hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be maintained. Fur-
ther research is needed for intermediate goods industries.
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11 Introduction
Empirical research on productivity and industrial organization widely uses sales
and industry–wide deﬂators as instruments for the corresponding theoretical vari-
ables (per–capita–)output and (idiosyncratic) prices. The need for instrumenta-
tion is caused by non-observability of output ﬁgures and ﬁrm speciﬁc prices. Un-
less all ﬁrms exhibit identical price–cost margins, the above approach introduces
an omitted variable bias into productivity estimates. In particular, scale elastici-
ties are underestimated (Klette and Griliches (1996)). Moreover, heterogeneous
market power of ﬁrms is neglected. As Klette and Griliches (1996) also pointed
out, a promising approach to remove the respective price bias emerging from en-
dogenous and unobserved pricing behavior is to impose sufﬁcient structure on the
product demand side of the ﬁrm’s decision problem. In particular, they use a mo-
nopolistic competition model in which they assume (small) and symmetric market
shares of ﬁrms within broadly deﬁned industries.
The study presented here, extends for asymmetric market shares and substi-
tution elasticities which differ between narrowly deﬁned market segments and
broadly deﬁned industries. It uses the most ﬂexible model of incomplete competi-
tion that consistently derives ﬁrm behavior out of consumer preferences for prod-
uct variety. Consumer preferences are the only critical assumption in the presented
model. A reﬁned version of the widely examined Dixit–Stiglitz–model (Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977)) is developed, with the following extensions: First, we allow for
asymmetric market shares. Consequently, the model discriminates between rele-
vant market segments which inﬂuence the ﬁrm speciﬁc choice of price on the one
hand and the more broadly deﬁned, but still differentiated, industry level on the
other hand. The latter has been used in former studies as an instrument to substi-
tute out the omitted variable bias. Second, we formalize substitution possibilities
between goods that depend on the aggregation level of the considered market. For
example, it seems sensible to assume the elasticity of substitution to be larger at
narrowly deﬁned markets in comparison to industry–wide demarcations.
The next section discusses the corresponding demand model and develops the
heterogeneous price bias elimination method. A critical assumption will be that
ﬁrms strictly follow a proﬁt-maximization strategy. Section 3 applies this method
to the manufacturing sector. Productivity estimates are performed using a rich
plant level data set. One result will be that the method performs sufﬁciently for
consumer goods afﬁliated industries, but further research is needed for intermedi-
ate goods industries. Section 4 concludes.
22 Economic Background
The previous section has pointed out that undetected idiosyncratic price setting
of ﬁrms has severe consequences in productivity estimates when ﬁrm level output
is unobserved and deﬂated sales (or deﬂated value added) based on an industry–
wide deﬂator is used as an instrument. The main objective of this paper is to
present a theoretically consistent method which removes the resulting omitted
variable bias and to test it empirically. This section introduces a demand system
that provides sufﬁcient economic structure to derive the proﬁt maximizing price–
output decision of any individual ﬁrm. We allow for incomplete competition and
ﬁrm level price setting caused by consumer preferences for product variety.
Our starting point is the widely examined (Spence–)Dixit–Stiglitz–model of
monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)). In extension of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), we do allow for entry barriers and sunk costs in order to not ex-
clude persistent proﬁts. In addition, the assumption of absence of different market
segments within one industry, hence, the assumption of symmetric market shares
at the industry level is relaxed.1
The next subsection examines the market structure.
2.1 The Demand System: Consumer Preferences for Product
Variety under Incomplete Competition
The major advantages of the monopolistic competition model are it’s ﬂexibility
and the fact that only a few assumptions are required for a rigorous derivation of
the results. The critical assumption deals with consumer preferences. Here, the
model states CES–type utility functions.
Relaxation of the symmetric market shares assumption can be interpreted as
follows: In this paper, we develop a two stage model with ”nested” market def-
initions: Firm speciﬁc pricing within the (relevant) market segment, hence, the
segment where the ﬁrm and its direct competitors sell their major product forms
stage one. Stage one market demarcation is embedded in a broader industry–wide
deﬁnition which encompasses diverging market segments and corresponds with
stage two. Industry and market segment deviate by the degree of substitutabil-
ity between any two goods or, formally, by elasticity of substitution. Consequently,
pricing rules differ between the two stages. Whereas stage one covers idiosyncratic
1 This sets up the basis for the intended extension of existing empirical work which
maintains this critical assumption (Klette and Griliches (1996)).
3price setting of ﬁrms, stage two reﬂects segment speciﬁc price setting relative the
average price level within the corresponding industry.2
The two stage model is as follows: Firm level demand Qit is determined by the
aggregate size of segment QSt, by the ﬁrm speciﬁc price relative the average price
in the market segment Pit/PSt, and by the demand elasticity with respect to indi-
vidual price changes, denoted by hi. Provided consumers maximize utility, hi is
deﬁned by the elasticity of substitution between goods of ﬁrm i and representative







Stage two extends to the industry level and takes care of the fact that, al-
though belonging to the same industry, substitution possibilities within narrowly
deﬁned markets differ signiﬁcantly from substitution possibilities between sepa-
rate markets. Correspondingly, at stage two, the focus is on the production share
of a particular market segment within an industry. Analogously to equation (1),







Notice, that we did not assume elasticity of substitution at the industry level to
coincide with elasticity of substitution within the speciﬁc market segment. The cor-
responding demand elasticities are captured by hS (industry level, equation (2))
and by hi (segment level, equation (1)). Finally, QIt measures industry demand
and PIt indicates the average price at the industry level. For simplicity, we con-
sider the demand elasticities hi and hS to be time–invariant. Taking logarithms,
equations (1) and (2) are rewritten as:
hi
−1 (lnQit −lnQSt) = lnPit −lnPSt (3)
and
hS
−1 (lnQSt −lnQIt) = lnPSt −lnPIt . (4)
2 In the empirical section, industries will be deﬁned on a 2/3–digit basis according to
ISIC–Rev. 3 classiﬁcation.
4The interpretation of these two equations is straightforward: The (log of the)
ﬁrm’s market share is determined by the (log of) ﬁrm level price relative the aver-
age price of the ﬁrm’s competitors and by the similarity between the ﬁrm’s and the
competitor’s products. Correspondingly, the relative weight of market segment S
within industry I is determined by the similarity between market segments as well
as by the difference between segment–speciﬁc and industry–average prices.
The next subsection solves the related optimization problem and derives proﬁt
maximizing price–cost margins which will be denoted as markup µ.
2.2 Proﬁt Maximization: Heterogeneous Price–Cost Margins
In this subsection an expression for the deviation of idiosyncratic prices from the
industry average is provided that counts for both, market speciﬁc and industry–
wide behavior. Given the assumption that consumers prefer product variety and
maximize utility, the solution of the proﬁt maximization problem
max
Qi
pi = Pi[Qi] Qi−c[Qi] (5)





￿ ! = c′[Qi], (6)
where we have omitted the period index t for simplicity. Solving equation
(6) for hi expresses the demand elasticity in terms of the ﬁrm speciﬁc markup





Equation (7) is valid if both, consumers and producers within a particular mar-
ket segment, strictly follow their optimization strategies. It disentangles the rela-
tionship between markups and demand elasticity or, equivalently, between price–
cost margins and substitution possibilities. Analogously to hi, relative changes
in the industry weights of market segments due to relative changes in the corre-





Combining (3) and (4) as well as substituting (7) or (8) for the respective
demand elasticity leads to the desired expression for idiosyncratic price deviations












 (lnQit −lnQIt). (9)
Equation (9) describes the deviation of idiosyncratic price setting from industry–
wide average in terms of a) the ﬁrm’s market share in it’s relevant market segment,
b) the ﬁrm’s share in total industry production, and c) the price–costs margins due
to market power, measured at different levels of aggregation, hence, represent-
ing diverging similarity levels of products. Let us denote (9) as the price–bias–
equation. Before resuming this equation in the next subsection, the production
function and, in particular, the productivity equation (which measures output per
capita) are examined.
2.3 Idiosyncratic Price Levels and the Productivity Equation:
The Price Bias Elimination Method
The objective of this subsection is to quantify the potential price bias that emerges
in productivity estimates when the unobserved left hand side variable output (or
output per capita) is instrumented by deﬂated sales (or labor productivity).
Let Qit indicate production of ﬁrm i in period t. Then the classical productivity
measure output per capita opc is denoted by
opc = Qit/Lit . (10)
Taking logs leads to our preferred performance measure lnopc:
lnopc = lnQit −lnLit . (11)
With respect to our primary focus, the estimation of scale elasticity and poten-
tial markups (price–cost margins), we have to examine, whether lnopc is observ-
able and, if not, which consequences result for productivity estimates, and how to
6cope with them, respectively.
Suppose, instead of lnopc only deﬂated labor productivity is measured, to-
gether with an industry–wide deﬂator. Denote the observed variable by prod. Clas-
sical empirical results will be biased, if prod deviates from opc. To identify the






















PIt measures value added, with the cost share of material sm.
Let us inspect equation (13): First, with time–invariant material shares, term ¬
vanishes, if growth rates are considered or panel estimates are performed. There-
fore and for simplicity, term ¬ does not appear in the further argumentation.
The price bias elimination method is concerned with grey–boxed terms ­ and ®.
Since the second term (lnQit −lnLit) captures exactly the theoretically preferred
performance measure lnopc, the resulting omitted variable bias is measured by
lnPit −lnPIt, hence, term ®.
Now recall equation (9) from the preceding subsection. If respective data con-
tain information on ﬁrm–level major product market shares within the relevant
segment and on the ﬁrm’s share in total industry production, the bias could be
substituted out. Unfortunately, our manufacturing data do provide ﬁrm’s market
shares, but not shares in total production. Therefore, we rewrite (13) by using (9)
and (11) to solve for the unknown share in total production:
prodit= µ−1































7with Dit = ln(1−smit). The interpretation of equation (15) is straightforward:
The price bias in productivity estimates which is caused by heterogeneous and
unobserved price setting can be easily and completely eliminated, if information
is available on two more variables: i. industry–wide production relative the ﬁrm
size (lnQIt −lnLit) and ii. the ﬁrm’s market share (lnQit −lnQSt). As mentioned
before, in the illustrating empirical section, the latter will be taken from plant
level data (for data description see Carstensen and Brand (1999)). Corresponding
industry–wide production levels are available from ofﬁcial statistics (Statistisches
Bundesamt (1998, 1996, 1995)).
To summarize the theoretical results, an empirical speciﬁcation of the labor
productivity equation should include two additional regressors: ﬁrst, industry
wide production level related to ﬁrm size and, second, the ﬁrm’s market share.
Notice, that this result is theoretically driven and relies on only a few assumptions,
namely derives an extended version of the widely recognized Dixit-Stiglitz–model.
The next section applies the elimination method and presents estimation results
on scale elasticity and price–cost margins. According to it’s property of completely
eliminating the corresponding omitted variable bias, the presented method will
also be denoted as heterogeneous price control.
3 Empirical Application: Price–Costs Margins and Scale
Elasticities in the Manufacturing Sector
The objective of this section is to empirically test the heterogeneous price control.
On the one hand, it is important to learn more about the empirical relevance of
ﬁrm speciﬁc pricing and product variety. On the other hand, we are interested in
the relative performance of the presented method that discriminates between ﬁrm
level and industry level markups, in comparison to known methods. The latter
assume symmetric market shares and take the elasticities of substitution between
goods as given and independent of the aggregation level of the data (Crepon,
Desplatz and Mairesse (1999), Klette and Griliches (1996)). As shown in the
previous section, when consumers have preferences for product variety and, in
addition, ﬁrm level output is unobserved, theory suggests the application of the
price bias elimination method. Although common practice, it is not sufﬁcient to
just deﬂate value added per capita, since in an environment with preferences for
product variety, producers individually choose proﬁt maximizing prices, hence,
idiosyncratic prices prevail, at least in the short run.
83.1 The Data
The empirical study is based on representative data that cover the manufacturing
sector. Data are taken from three sources: The major data source is the Hannover
Firm Panel (HFP), a representative cross–section time–series data set for plants
with at least ﬁve employees (Lower Saxony, Germany). The sample consists of
1025 privately–owned enterprises and contains annual information over the pe-
riod from 1993 to 1997 for a total of 2686 observations. The economic content of
the yearly questionnaires is similar to British and Australian WIRS (workplace and
industrial relations survey, Millward (1993)). The following variables are taken
from HFP: number of employees, value added, time dummies, sector information
and market share (component ii. of heterogeneous price control).
Industry wide production (component i. of heterogeneous price control) is taken
from a second data source which is supplied by Federal Statistics Service (Statistis-
ches Bundesamt (1998), Statistisches Bundesamt (1997)). In order to attain sufﬁ-
cient response rates, the HFP questionnaires lack physical capital and investment
in productive capital. Thus, capital has been imputed from records of the German
central bank which cover 85 % of German plants. That source provides informa-
tion on capital shares on a (ISIC Rev. 3–3-digits)×(sales–classes) basis (Bundesbank
(1999)). Finally, physical capital for each sample unit has been constructed by
multiplying ﬁrm level sales with the capital share within the associated industry–
sales–class cell.
3.2 Speciﬁcation Issues
In general, we follow common practice and assume that ﬁrms produce accord-
ing to a Cobb–Douglas type production technology.3 Price–cost margins and scale
elasticity are simultaneously estimated with no restriction imposed on factor pro-
ductivity or pricing, like, for example, constant return to scale.
Output Qit of ﬁrm i is produced with classical input factors (labor Lit, capital
Kit). Overall efﬁciency shifts are summarized in Ait:





where Ait = exp(ait +gt) is composed of a ﬁrm level efﬁciency term ait and a
3 An issue for future work is the integration of alternative functional forms (e. g. translog
type production functions) and the control for heterogeneous input factors (skill com-
position, technology and machinery equipment etc.).
9common time trend gt which captures factor independent technological progress.
Consequently, lnopc is speciﬁed as:
lnopc = lnAit +(al +ak−1)lnLit +ak (lnKit −lnLit) (17)
= lnAit +(scale elasticity−1) lnL+ak (lnKit −lnLit) . (18)
Combining equations (15) and (18) and adding a normally distributed error
term uit yields:
prodit = b0 +b1 lnLit +b2 (lnKit −lnLit) +b3 (lnQIt −lnLit) (19)
+ b4 ln(lnQit −lnQSt) + b5t + uit .
Which estimation procedure is appropriate depends on the distribution of the
error term uit. If, for example, uit ∼ iidN(0,s2), hence, E(uu’) = diag[s2
1,...,s2
n]
and E(Xit u) = 0, ordinary least squares is applicable. Our estimates rely on a
generalized estimation of the covariance matrix (Savin and White (1977), White
(1980)), since heteroscedasticity and serial correlation have been detected. Thus,
autocorrelation– and heteroscedasticity–robust t-values are documented (tables
3–5). For unobserved heterogeneity has been controlled for in panel estimates
(tables 6 and 7).
3.3 Results
Description of the variables and descriptive statistics are depicted in table 2. The
remaining tables show the econometric results of the application of the price
bias elimination method. Speciﬁcation tests for preparatory estimates (not doc-
umented here) detected heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Therefore, GLS
estimations with an autocorrelation resistent and heteroscedasticity consistent co-
variance matrix are performed. Basic econometric models appear in Table 3. These
models treat the manufacturing sector as a whole. Models 1 to 3 suppress the
additional regressors that aim at removing the price bias and serve as a basis
for comparisons. Model 4 introduces the price bias elimination method. Again
for reasons of comparison, model 5 presents GLS results, which are corrected for
ﬁrst order serially correlated residuals following the method of Prais–Winsten (see
Stata (2001)).
10Tables 4 and 5 correspond with basic model 4, but present industry speciﬁc
results, where we distinguish 9 industries based on a 2/3–digit ISIC–Rev. 3 clas-
siﬁcation. Fixed Effects results are shown in tables 6 and 7. In addition, Random
Effects estimations have been performed when the LM–test pointed out the exis-
tence of random effects and the Hausman speciﬁcation test could not reject the
hypothesis that the unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc effect is uncorrelated with other re-
gressors. These additional estimates are not documented, since results do not
differ much from FE results. Moreover, because of the weak and mixed results of
the ﬁxed effects estimates and with respect to small sample–size, we concentrate
further interpretation on tables 3 to 5.
Various speciﬁcation tests appear in the lower part of these tables. In addition
to standard tests, they mainly deal with the explanatory power of the price bias
elimination method. First, the overall relevance of heterogeneous price control is
tested. Second, the hypothesis of identical substitution possibilities within and be-
tween market segments is investigated (identical markups). Third, the statement
of marginal cost pricing is questioned and ﬁnally, the validity of constant returns
to scale is tested. If, for example, the hypotheses of identical markups is rejected,
the presented price bias elimination method outperforms existing methods which
are merely based on industry demand (Klette and Griliches (1996) and Crepon
et al. (1999)).
Table 3 includes three basic models, which impose the restriction of homoge-
neous product pricing within sectors (model 1 to model 3). Model 1 and model 2
are nested in model 3. Model 1 neglects technical change and excludes sector spe-
ciﬁc inﬂuences on productivity. Model 2 extends model 1 by controlling for disem-
bodied technical change. Model 3 extends model 2 by sector controls. Wald tests
for joint signiﬁcance suggest both, the inclusion of time controls and of sector con-
trols. Without exception, the labor and capital coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant.
Sector and time controls are signiﬁcant at the 1%–percent level, where included.
The Hypothesis that no variables have been omitted as well as the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale are rejected for any of the three basic models.
––––––––––––––––––––––-
insert table 3 here
––––––––––––––––––––––-
Eventually, the heterogeneous price control is introduced in model 4 (additional
variables industry output and market share). The hypothesis of homogeneous pric-
ing is rejected at the 1%–level. Thus, price control is not irrelevant. Moreover,
ﬁrm level markups do not coincide with markups at higher aggregation levels
11(5%–level), hence, existing models seem to be improved. At the ﬁrm level, the
difference between product price and marginal cost is signiﬁcant at the 5%–level.
The estimated markup b µi amounts to 9.2%. Like for the previous models, the
hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected at the 1%–level (see table 1).
The following tables 4 and 5 replicate model 4 for 9 industry groups separately.
Here, the thirty sectors are aggregated to 9 groups (2/3–digit ISIC–Rev. 3 classi-
ﬁcation, see Statistisches Bundesamt (1996, 1997)). Table 4 presents the results
for the food industry DA in column 1. Column 2 represents ceramics/glass (DI).
Textile, leather, and clothing (DB and DC) appear in column 3. Wood industry
(DD) is documented in column 4.
Table 5 encompasses the other ﬁve industry groups: The results for paper and
print (DE) appear in column 1. The chemical industry, rubber and plastics are
presented in column 2 (DF, DG and DH). Productivity estimates for metal products
(DH) can be found in column 3. Machinery and car building (DF and DG) appear
in column 4. The last column 5 documents the results for electrical equipment and
data processing/IT (DL).
––––––––––––––––––––––-
insert table 4 here
––––––––––––––––––––––-
––––––––––––––––––––––-
insert table 5 here
––––––––––––––––––––––-
The upper part of the tables is again split into three subparts: a) classical input
factors labor and capital, b) technological progress control and additional sector
controls (where adequate), and c) the variables to eliminate the price bias. The
lower part includes speciﬁcation tests. Our focus during interpretation is on the
three hypotheses on heterogeneous pricing and market power. First, the joint sig-
niﬁcance of the heterogeneous price control variables is tested. For example, the
bold faced value (0.04) in column 4 (table 4) indicates for the wood products
industry that price setting is endogenous and heterogenous the 5%–level. The sec-
ond hypothesis µi = µS states that markups are identical across aggregation levels,
which is equivalent to the hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution between
any to goods within one market segment is the same as across market segments
and sectors within the industries groups. For the above industry, this hypotheses
is rejected at the 5%–level (see (0.03)), indicating that the price bias elimination
method which has been developed in this paper improves existing literature.
12For ﬁve industries these differences in demand elasticity are signiﬁcant: Wood
products, paper and printing, metal products, machinery, and electrical equip-
ment. These industries could be regarded as supplying (differentiated) durable
goods with idiosyncratic product characteristics. Thus, empirical evidence is in fa-
vor of the theoretical predictions on idiosyncratic market power in a differentiated
products environment.
The third hypotheses pi =C′[Qi] is concerned with variations within estimated
markups compared to their size. The corresponding null hypothesis states that µi =
1. If this hypothesis is rejected, price–cost margins at the ﬁrm level are statistically
proven and durable rents exist at the ﬁrm level. At a second stage such rents could
be part of a bargaining process between management and worker representation,
an interesting question for further research. Table 1 gives an impression on the
size of such markups (and of the simultaneously estimated scale elasticities).
Table 1: Firm level price–cost margins and scale elasticities a
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level of sign.: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
a Data source: The Hannover Firmpanel (1994–1997); Statistisches Bundesamt ; Bundesbank.
b Level of signiﬁcance in parentheses.
Although markups seem to reach a considerable amount, the marginal–cost–
pricing hypotheses and, correspondingly, a long run optimum with zero proﬁts
could not be rejected for seven of the nine industries. Signiﬁcant deviation from
marginal cost pricing is only found for ﬁrms operating in the print and paper in-
13dustry (5%–level) or in machinery (borderline signiﬁcance: 10%–level). The rep-
resentative ﬁrm within paper and print earns a markup of 62%. The counterpart
within machinery charges price which exceed marginal costs by 26%.
Given the size of the markup, the corresponding demand elasticity can by cal-
culated (see equation (7)). For the manufacture of machinery we estimate a de-
mand elasticity of −4.9, compared to −6.0 in Klette and Griliches (1996). A result
which could indicate that demand for machinery product in Norway is more elastic
than in Germany, hence, implying larger market power. In contrast to Klette and
Griliches (1996), there is no evidence of ﬁrm level markups for the manufacture
of electrical apparatus and supplies (including IT systems), although the hypoth-
esis of homogeneous price setting is clearly rejected. However, the speciﬁcation
is questionable, since omitted variables are detected, and if we control for unob-
served ﬁrm speciﬁc effects (within estimator), the price bias elimination variables
completely lose signiﬁcance. Maybe, ﬁrm speciﬁc markups and markups at the
industry level of electrical equipment are rather stable.
As noted by Klette and Griliches (1996), empirical research on the issue of im-
perfect competition and scale economies is rather controversial and still an open
question. If output prices are unknown, heterogeneous and endogenous, estimates
of factor elasticities and, consequently, of scale elasticity will be biased. Scale elas-
ticity will be biased downwards if ﬁrms have market power, hence if µi > 1. Con-
trolling for idiosyncratic pricing, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (crts)
has been tested for each of the nine industries. The results are interesting (see also
table 1): First, those industries which also show heterogeneous and idiosyncratic
pricing show slightly increasing return to scale (paper and printing: 1.03, machin-
ery: 1.05). Moreover, increasing returns to scale are prevalent for ceramics/glass
(1.02), wood products (1.16), chemicals (1.05), electrical equipment/IT (1.02).
Third, slightly decreasing returns to scale are proven for the food industry (0.99)
and for metal products (0.99). The relatively large scale elasticity for chemical
products coincides with expectations. In general, scale elasticities are smaller in
our sample than in Klette and Griliches (1996): They found values of 1.09 for
machinery and 1.07 for electrical equipment.
The Ramsey test detects omitted variables for the food industry, for chemi-
cals/plastics and for electrical equipment. Here, an issue for future work is to
control for heterogenous input, such as skilled work and investment in further
training. A more elaborated speciﬁcation of technological progress, for example
embodied in input factors is another task for future research on heterogeneous
pricing.
144 Concluding Remarks
It is widely known that idiosyncratic price setting behavior and market power of
ﬁrms result in an omitted variable bias for productivity estimates, if (unobserved)
ﬁrm level output is instrumented by deﬂated sales or labor productivity. How-
ever, with regard to lacking data it is still common to ignore the bias and assume
industry–common pricing rules when estimating factor and scale elasticities.
This paper has suggested usage of a correction method which eliminates the
corresponding bias and allows market speciﬁc pricing rules in addition to industry–
wide rules. This method has been derived theoretically on the basis of a well
deﬁned demand system, which imposed sufﬁcient structure on the ﬁrm level opti-
mization problem.
In addition, the price bias elimination method has been applied and tested em-
pirically with German manufacturing data. If statistically proven, price–cost mar-
gins and slightly increasing returns to scale are found simultaneously. Although
estimation results are quite convincing for traditional durable goods industries,
further work is needed for industries which produce intermediate products.
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16A Appendix: Variable Description and Estimation Results
Table 2: Variable Description
Variable Mean Std. Dev.. N Description a
ln Kit −ln Lit 9.826 0.688 2124 capital intensity (in logs),
ln Lit 8.797 1.111 2124 labor input (annual average of number
of employees, in logs),
ln Rit −ln Lit 10.913 0.522 2124 labor productivity (dependent vari-
able), in logs,
industry–wide production 1.708 0.211 1484 log of total production of industry, de-
ﬁned on a 2/3–digit basis according
to ISIC–Rev. 3 classiﬁcation (ln QIt −
ln Lit),
market share 1.678 1.242 1638 share of the ﬁrm’s major product in
the relevant market segment: ln Qit −
ln QSt(in logs),
sector control 2124 dummy variable for sector (30 Sectors,
classiﬁcation: 4–digit according WZ 93
(similar ISIC Rev. 3)).
time control 2124 dummy variable for year of observa-
tion (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996).
a Deﬂated value in EUR.
17Table 3: Productivity equations (basic models), dependent variable:
deﬂated labor productivity, method: FGLS with autocorrelation re-
sistent and White HCCM (M 1-4), Prais-Whinston-AR(1)-correction
with robust standard errors (M 5)a























time control — yes∗ yes∗ yes∗∗ yes∗∗
sector control — — yes∗∗ yes∗∗ yes∗∗





















No. of cases 1139 1139 1139 1139 1139
R2 61.87 62.03 70.64 71.10 98.44
RMSE 0.328 0.328 0.292 0.290 0.217
Ramsey–Test e1/ DW–Stat. e2 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) –/1.72
H0 : elimination
method irrelevant f — — — (0.01) (0.01)
H0 : µs = µi
g — — — (0.01) (0.02)
H0 : pi =C′[Qi] h — — — (0.03) (0.02)
H0 : constant RTS i (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
level of sign.: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
a Data source: The Hannover Firmpanel (1994–1997); Statistisches Bundesamt ; Bundesbank.
b Standard deviation in parentheses.
c Formally: ln QIt −ln Lit, classiﬁcation of industries according to WZ 93 (∼ ISIC–Rev. 3, Bald-Herbel and
Herbel (1995), Nowack and Weisbrod (1995), Statistisches Bundesamt (1998)).
d Market share of the ﬁrm, demarcation: market, where the major product is placed, lnQit −lnQSt.
e1 Hypothesis: No omitted variables, rejection level in parentheses. e2 Hypothesis: No positive or negative
serial autocorrelation (boldfaced if rejected 5%-level).
f Joint signiﬁcance of the additional regressors.
g Test on the relative performance of the heterogeneous price control method compared to Klette and
Griliches (1996) and Crepon et al. (1999), rejection level for the hypotheses of common markups.
h Hypothesis: marginal cost pricing is effective, rejection level in parentheses.
i Hypothesis: constant returns to scale, rejection level in parentheses.
18Table 4: Preferences for product variety and heterogeneous price set-
ting, separate estimates for Food, Ceramics/Glass, Textile/Clothing
and Wood products, dependent variable: deﬂated value added per
capita, method: FGLS with autocorrelation resistent and White HCCMa
Food Ceramics/ Textile/Leather Wood



















time control yes yes yes yes†
sector control — yes yes∗∗ yes

























No. of cases 119 125 68 94
R2 77.75 76.43 64.22 76.52
Ramsey–Test e (0.01) (0.11) (0.21) (0.77)
H0 : elimination
method irrelevant f (0.61) (0.69) (0.24) (0.02)
H0 : µs = µi
g (0.41) (0.43) (0.33) (0.01)
H0 : pi =C′[Qi] h (0.69) (0.90) (0.11) (0.52)
H0 : constant RTS i (0.03) (0.00) (0.77) (0.73)
level of sign.: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
a Data source: The Hannover Firmpanel, Wave 1 to 4 (1994–1997); Statistisches Bundesamt ; Bundesbank.
b Standard deviation in parentheses.
c Formally: ln QIt −ln Lit, classiﬁcation of industries according to WZ 93 (∼ ISIC–Rev. 3, Bald-Herbel and Herbel
(1995), Nowack and Weisbrod (1995), Statistisches Bundesamt (1998)).
d Market share of the ﬁrm, demarcation: market, where the major product is placed, lnQit −lnQSt.
e Hypothesis: No omitted variables, rejection level in parentheses.
f Joint signiﬁcance of the additional regressors.
g Test on the relative performance of the heterogeneous price control method compared to Klette and Griliches
(1996) and Crepon et al. (1999), rejection level for the hypotheses of common markups.
h Hypothesis: marginal cost pricing is effective, rejection level in parentheses.
i Hypothesis: constant returns to scale, rejection level in parentheses.
19Table 5: Preferences for product variety and heterogeneous price setting, separate estimates for
Paper/Printing, Chemicals/Plastics, Metal products, Machinery, Electrical Equipment, dependent
variable: deﬂated value added per capita, method: FGLS with autocorrelation resistent and White
HCCMa
Paper-/ Chemicals/ Metal Machinery/ Electrical























time control yes∗∗ yes yes yes∗ yes
sector control yes∗∗ yes∗∗ yes∗ yes∗ yes































No. of cases 107 164 111 210 94
R2 69.50 74.20 47.06 53.96 79.39
Ramsey–Test e (0.84) (0.00) (0.23) (0.12) (0.01)
H0 : elimination
method irrelevant f (0.01) (0.89) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05)
H0 : µs = µi
g (0.05) (0.79) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
H0 : pi =C′[Qi] h (0.03) (0.65) (0.99) (0.09) (0.35)
H0 : constant RTS i (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
level of sign.: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
a Data source: The Hannover Firmpanel, Wave 1 to 4 (1994–1997); Statistisches Bundesamt; Bundesbank.
b Standard deviation in parentheses.
c Formally: ln QIt −ln Lit, classiﬁcation of industries according to WZ 93 (∼ ISIC–Rev. 3, Bald-Herbel and Herbel (1995),
Nowack and Weisbrod (1995), Statistisches Bundesamt (1998)).
d Market share of the ﬁrm, demarcation: market, where the major product is placed, lnQit −lnQSt.
e Hypothesis: No omitted variables, rejection level in parentheses.
f Joint signiﬁcance of the additional regressors.
g Test on the relative performance of the heterogeneous price control method compared to Klette and Griliches (1996)
and Crepon et al. (1999), rejection level for the hypotheses of common markups.
h Hypothesis: marginal cost pricing is effective, rejection level in parentheses.
i Hypothesis: constant returns to scale, rejection level in parentheses.
2
0Table 6: Preferences for product variety and heterogeneous price setting, separate estimates for
Food, Ceramics/Glass, Textile/Clothing and Wood products, dependent variable: deﬂated value
added per capita, method: Fixed Effectsa
All plants Food Ceramics/ Textile/Leather Wood























time control yes∗∗ yes∗∗ yes yes yes































N (cases;groups) 1139;566 119;58 125;61 68;32 94;50
R2 56.52 76.13 75.62 38.23 13.68
Hausman–Test e (0.00) (0.26) (0.94) (0.86) (0.38)
H0 : elimination
method irrelevant f (0.04) (0.18) (0.35) (0.52) (0.80)
H0 : µs = µi
g (0.94) (0.84) (0.16) (0.69) (0.96)
H0 : pi =C′[Qi] h (0.01) (0.08) (0.97) (0.29) (0.51)
H0 : constant RTS i (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.35) (0.09)
level of sign.: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
a Data source: The Hannover Firmpanel, Wave 1 to 4 (1994–1997); Statistisches Bundesamt; Bundesbank.
b Standard deviation in parentheses.
c Formally: ln QIt −ln Lit, classiﬁcation of industries according to WZ 93 (∼ ISIC–Rev. 3, Bald-Herbel and Herbel (1995),
Nowack and Weisbrod (1995), Statistisches Bundesamt (1998)).
d Market share of the ﬁrm, demarcation: market, where the major product is placed, lnQit −lnQSt.
e Hypothesis: Firm speciﬁc effects ni are uncorrelated with regressors (rejection level for RE-model).
F-Test (H0 : all ni = 0) always rejected at the 1%-level.)
f Joint signiﬁcance of the additional regressors.
g Test on the relative performance of the heterogeneous price control method compared to Klette and Griliches (1996)
and Crepon et al. (1999), rejection level for the hypotheses of common markups.
h Hypothesis: marginal cost pricing is effective, rejection level in parentheses.
i Hypothesis: constant returns to scale, rejection level in parentheses.
2
1Table 7: Preferences for product variety and heterogeneous price setting, separate estimates for
Paper/Printing, Chemicals/Plastics, Metal products, Machinery, Electrical Equipment, dependent
variable: deﬂated value added per capita, method: Fixed Effectsa
Paper-/ Chemicals/ Metal Machinery/ Electrical























time control yes∗∗ yes yes yes∗∗ yes































N (cases;groups) 107;57 164;85 111;61 210;103 94;44
R2 60.79 73.51 38.81 53.49 12.94
Hausman–Test e (0.00) (0.07) (0.97) (0.13) (0.05)
H0 : elimination
method irrelevant f (0.27) (0.92) (0.09) (0.01) (0.48)
H0 : µs = µi
g (0.18) (0.68) (0.03) (0.05) (0.31)
H0 : pi =C′[Qi] h (0.37) (0.97) (0.83) (0.01) (0.41)
H0 : constant RTS i (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
level of sign.: †: 10% ∗: 5% ∗∗: 1%
a Data source: The Hannover Firmpanel, Wave 1 to 4 (1994–1997); Statistisches Bundesamt; Bundesbank.
b Standard deviation in parentheses.
c Formally: ln QIt −ln Lit, classiﬁcation of industries according to WZ 93 (∼ ISIC–Rev. 3, Bald-Herbel and Herbel (1995),
Nowack and Weisbrod (1995), Statistisches Bundesamt (1998)).
d Market share of the ﬁrm, demarcation: market, where the major product is placed, lnQit −lnQSt.
e Hypothesis: Firm speciﬁc effects ni are uncorrelated with regressors (rejection level for RE-model).
F-Test (H0 : all ni = 0) always rejected at the 1%-level.
f Joint signiﬁcance of the additional regressors.
g Test on the relative performance of the heterogeneous price control method compared to Klette and Griliches (1996)
and Crepon et al. (1999), rejection level for the hypotheses of common markups.
h Hypothesis: marginal cost pricing is effective, rejection level in parentheses.
i Hypothesis: constant returns to scale, rejection level in parentheses.
2
2